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UNEQUAL INEQUALITIES? 
POVERTY, SEXUAL ORIENTATION, AND THE DYNAMICS OF 
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 
 
Jane S. Schacter* 
 
As we think about the future role the judicial branch will play in our 
governance, we might consider one important function of the courts: addressing 
claims of constitutional inequality. In this Article, I explore this question by 
juxtaposing two claims of inequality that have been pressed by advocates—one 
concerning sexual orientation, the other concerning poverty. These two contexts 
are undoubtedly different in ways both numerous and significant. The lesbian, gay, 
bisexual, and transgender (LGBT) rights movement is today, while the 
constitutional movement for the rights of the poor was yesterday.1 The LGBT 
movement has won major Supreme Court victories in its biggest cases of the last 
generation—Romer v. Evans,2 Lawrence v. Texas,3 and, most recently, United 
States v. Windsor,4 and it seems to be on a constitutional roll of sorts. The 
constitutional movement for the poor, by contrast, won some significant Supreme 
Court victories in the 1960s and early 1970s in cases like Harper v. Virginia Board 
of Elections,5 Shapiro v. Thompson,6 and Goldberg v. Kelly,7 but then lost its most 
ambitious claims in Dandridge v. Williams8 and San Antonio Independent School 
* © 2014 Jane S. Schacter. William Nelson Cromwell Professor of Law, Stanford 
Law School. I owe special thanks to Juliet Brodie, who is deeply knowledgeable and wise 
about law and poverty and has helped me think through many of the issues addressed here. 
I also thank Lydia Gray and Matt Higgins for excellent research assistance. I benefited 
greatly from the lively discussions at the symposium and from a faculty workshop at 
Stanford Law School. 
1 Issues of “income inequality” have been on the more recent public agenda, but these 
questions have typically been framed in terms of disparities between and among those in 
different economic strata, as opposed to a concern for the poorest among us. See generally, 
e.g., JOSEPH E. STIGLITZ, THE PRICE OF INEQUALITY (2013) (arguing that the American 
economic system creates inequality and threatens democracy).  
2 517 U.S. 620 (1996) (striking down a broadly drawn anti-gay-rights initiative). 
3 539 U.S. 558 (2003) (striking down a ban on consensual same-sex sodomy). 
4 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013) (striking down a portion of the federal Defense of Marriage 
Act). 
5 383 U.S. 663 (1966) (striking down a state poll tax). 
6 394 U.S. 618 (1969) (striking down a one-year waiting period for welfare benefits 
imposed on new state residents). 
7 397 U.S. 254 (1970) (treating the receipt of welfare benefits as a property interest 
and requiring a hearing before termination of those benefits). 
8 397 U.S. 471 (1970) (upholding a state cap on welfare benefits to families over a 
certain size, even though larger families received fewer benefits). 
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District v. Rodriguez.9 It never really recovered. Indeed, it is not uncommon to 
hear laments like the one sounded in Justice Marshall’s dissent in James v. 
Valtierra,10 which excoriated the majority for the toothless standard of review it 
applied and suggested that equal-protection claims made on behalf of poor people 
receive “no scrutiny whatsoever.”11 
The differences between these two movements, moreover, go well beyond 
matters of timing and win-loss record. One difference pertains to the claims 
themselves. Any ambitious equality-based challenge in the realm of poverty poses 
a fundamental challenge to the liberal state and the market. By contrast, the 
constitutional movement for LGBT rights has largely concerned formal equality 
and can, at least as framed by some, coexist easily with a libertarian agenda.12 
Another core difference relates to the line between “affirmative rights” and 
“negative liberties.”13 This line is not as bright as it is sometimes made out to be. 
Some opponents of marriage equality, for example, argue that according a right to 
same-sex marriage is a far cry from invalidating laws criminalizing same-sex 
intimacy and unjustifiably crosses a line into “affirmative recognition.”14 Even 
granting that there is some malleability in the affirmative/negative distinction, 
poverty- and sexual-orientation-based equality claims do seem to straddle a line of 
that sort, with robust constitutional protections against poverty more consistent 
with the kind of affirmative, social democratic norms that have never had much 
uptake in this country.  
There are also important distinctions involving what courts might be called 
upon to do in order to remedy these two kinds of inequality. While the institutional 
legitimacy of courts invalidating bans on same-sex marriage and same-sex sodomy 
has been contested, the remedy for those constitutional violations is time limited 
9 411 U.S. 1 (1973) (rejecting a challenge to a state education funding formula that 
disadvantaged the poorest districts). 
10 402 U.S. 137 (1971) (Marshall, J., dissenting). 
11 Id. at 145 (Marshall, J., dissenting); see also Julie A. Nice, No Scrutiny 
Whatsoever: Deconstitutionalization of Poverty Law, Dual Rules of Law, and Dialogic 
Default, 35 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 629 (2008) (arguing that the Supreme Court has failed to 
apply meaningful constitutional protections to the poor).  
12 See, e.g., Dale Carpenter, Is Lawrence Libertarian?, 88 MINN. L. REV. 1140, 1140–
41 (2004) (noting that many libertarians view Lawrence as “a libertarian revolution”).  
13 See generally Helen Hershkoff, “Just Words”: Common Law and the Enforcement 
of State Constitutional Social and Economic Rights, 62 STAN L. REV. 1521, 1522 (2010) 
(exploring basis for “so-called positive rights [that] embrace guarantees to goods and 
services such as public schooling, health care, and a clean environment); Robin West, 
Unenumerated Duties, 9 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 221, 221 (2006) (contrasting “negative duties 
to restrain from acting” with “positive, affirmative duties to pass laws so as to achieve 
various welfarist ends”).  
14 These arguments are addressed, for example, in David D. Meyer, A Privacy Right 
to Public Recognition of Family Relationships? The Cases of Marriage and Adoption, 51 
VILL. L. REV. 891, 892 (2006) and Cass R. Sunstein, Liberty After Lawrence, 65 OHIO ST. 
L.J. 1059, 1073–75 (2004).  
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and discrete,15 and there are not nearly the layers of remedial complexity that go 
along with attempts, in the name of constitutional principle, to equalize school 
funding or guarantee minimum provision. When combined with what some view 
as the illegitimate, “zero sum” aspect of redistributive efforts by governmental 
actors, the particular resistance that courts might encounter in more aggressively 
addressing poverty comes clearly into view. 
All of these differences are readily apparent and significant. They suggest 
some important reasons why the Supreme Court has done far less to address 
inequality that is based on wealth compared to that which is based on sexual 
orientation. Nevertheless, despite—or perhaps because of—these differences, I 
suggest that we can draw some larger insights about the dynamics of courts and 
constitutional inequality claims by thinking about these sets of constitutional 
claims in relation to one another. After reviewing the history, I will suggest that the 
contrast underscores, and gives some shape and texture, to three such dynamics: 
the different ways that politics and public opinion can shape judicial decision 
making, the increasingly significant role of state courts in forging constitutional 
norms, and both the failures and the fading of the traditional tiers of equal-
protection scrutiny.  
 
I.  HISTORY OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL CLAIMS 
 
The history of the constitutional movement for LGBT equality is a fairly 
recent one that continues to unfold. For our purposes, the trajectory can be traced 
fairly quickly.16 That is far less true for the history of poverty-related claims, and I 
will accordingly lay out the history of that movement, and the key Supreme Court 
decisions, in more detail.  
 
A.  Sexual Orientation and Constitutional Equality 
 
The first major Supreme Court decision on LGBT equality came some 
seventeen years after the Stonewall uprising in New York, an event often taken to 
have inaugurated an organized national movement for LGBT equality. That first 
case was Bowers v. Hardwick,17 which turned on liberty, not equal protection. But 
as has long been true in the realm of sexual orientation, liberty and equality claims 
15 This was somewhat less true when civil unions were a more prominent option than 
they seem to be today. See Baker v. State, 744 A.2d 864 (Vt. 1999) (finding a state 
constitutional violation in restricting marriage to opposite-sex couples, but allowing the 
legislature to remedy the violation by enacting comprehensive civil unions); see also Lewis 
v. Harris, 908 A.2d 196 (N.J. 2006) (holding the same as Baker).  
16 More detailed histories can be found in MICHAEL J. KLARMAN, FROM THE CLOSET 
TO THE ALTAR: COURTS, BACKLASH, AND THE STRUGGLE FOR SAME-SEX MARRIAGE, at x–
xii (2013); Jane S. Schacter, Courts and the Politics of Backlash: Marriage Equality 
Litigation, Then and Now, 82 SO. CAL. L. REV. 1153 (2009). 
17 478 U.S. 186 (1986). 
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are intertwined in many ways. Certainly Bowers, upholding the constitutionality of 
a Georgia law criminalizing sodomy, powerfully implicated the equality of gay 
people and was criticized for the inequality it seemed to accept.18 
Bowers was followed by a pair of cases that bore on gay equality in a different 
way. These were cases reversing the decision of a state court holding that a state or 
local antidiscrimination law protected the right of gay persons to participate in a 
Boston St. Patrick’s Day parade or the Boy Scouts. First in Hurley v. Irish-
American Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Group of Boston,19 then in Boy Scouts of 
America v. Dale,20 the Supreme Court upheld claims that those who wished to 
exclude gay participants were protected by the First Amendment. In between these 
cases, however, the constitutional tide began to turn. In Romer v. Evans, the Court 
struck down a Colorado constitutional amendment that banned any non-
discrimination protection for lesbian, gay, and bisexual persons in that state.21 The 
decision was doctrinally cryptic. It appeared to apply a highly unorthodox—and 
unexplained—version of rational-basis review, and it was silent on the continuing 
fate of Bowers. Nevertheless, it reflected the first application of the Equal 
Protection Clause to protect LGBT persons.  
Seven years after Romer, Lawrence v. Texas expressly overruled Bowers and 
wove into its due-process analysis ideas traditionally associated with equality—
ideas about dignity, respect, and the injustice of stigma.22 When Lawrence was 
decided in 2003, a heated debate about same-sex marriage was well underway in 
the country, having started a decade earlier when the Hawaii Supreme Court issued 
an unexpected decision signaling an openness to a right of same-sex couples to 
marry under that state’s constitution.23 In its language, however, Lawrence 
attempted to steer clear of the marriage issue and limit its focus to laws banning 
consensual adult sodomy.24 Ten years after Lawrence, the Court squarely 
addressed same-sex marriage for the first time.25 By this time, several states had 
legalized same-sex marriage, and public opinion had steadily grown to be 
significantly more supportive of marriage equality than it was when Lawrence was 
decided.26 In United States v. Windsor,27 the Court struck down the portion of the 
federal Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA) that barred the federal government from 
18 See generally, e.g., Christopher R. Leslie, Creating Criminals: The Injuries 
Inflicted by “Unenforced” Sodomy Laws, 35 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 103 (2000). 
19 515 U.S. 557 (1995).  
20 530 U.S. 640 (2000).  
21 517 U.S. 620, 635 (1995). 
22 539 U.S. 558, 578 (2002). 
23 KLARMAN, supra note 16, at xi, 48, 75. 
24 539 U.S. at 578 (noting that the case did not “involve whether the government must 
give formal recognition to any relationship that homosexual persons seek to enter”).  
25 Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2693 (striking down the federal Defense of Marriage Act). 
26 See generally Jane S. Schacter, Making Sense of the Marriage Debate, 91 TEX. L. 
REV. 1185 (2013). 
27 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013). 
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recognizing any same-sex marriages. The opinion relied on the Equal Protection 
Clause and used the doctrine of federalism as a piece of supporting evidence for its 
belief that DOMA violated constitutional equality norms.28 Noting that the federal 
government had historically accepted a state’s definition of marriage, the Court 
found that the government’s decision to abandon that practice in this single context 
supported an inference of discrimination.29 At the same time the Court decided 
Windsor, it declined to rule on the merits of Hollingsworth v. Perry,30 a challenge 
to California’s Proposition 8 (“Prop 8”). The state’s voters approved Prop 8 in 
2008, and the measure wiped out a state supreme court decision in favor of 
marriage equality.31 Prop 8 was struck down in the federal district court, but the 
Supreme Court found that because the governor and the attorney general refused to 
appeal the district court’s decision, the petitioners did not have standing.32 Thus, 
the decision of the district court stood.  
Since Windsor and Perry came down in June 2013, many more states have 
legalized same-sex marriage, and many more judges all over the country have 
struck down state laws denying marriage equality.33 Given the sheer number of 
cases all over the country now challenging restrictive marriage laws, it seems 
inevitable that another case on same-sex marriage will be back in the Supreme 
Court before too long. 
 
B.  Poverty and Constitutional Claims 
 
If the discussion is framed in terms of the movements for LGBT and poor 
peoples’ rights, a reader could be forgiven for asking about the latter: what 
movement? While there are active national movements today in some areas that I 
will discuss—the adequacy of school funding being perhaps the most salient34—
one is hard-pressed to identify any ongoing, overarching social movement seeking 
equality for the poor as a class, much less one with an active constitutional 
28 Id. at 2692–93. 
29 See id. at 2693. 
30 133 S. Ct. 2652 (2013). 
31 Id. at 2659. 
32 Id. at 2668. 
33 Masuma Ahuja et al., The Changing Landscape on Same-Sex Marriage, WASH. 
POST, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/special/politics/same-sex-marriage/ (last 
updated May 15, 2014); Richard Socarides, The Growing Impact of the Supreme Court’s 
Gay-Marriage Ruling, THE NEW YORKER (Jan. 27, 2014), http://www.newyorker.com/onli 
ne/blogs/newsdesk/2014/01/the-widening-impact-of-the-supreme-courts-gay-marriage-ruli 
ng.html. 
34 Another example is the national “Civil Gideon” movement seeking improved 
access to justice for the poor in the context of civil claims. For background on both, see 
JULIET M. BRODIE ET AL., POVERTY LAW: POLICY AND PRACTICE (2014).  
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docket.35 This is clearest in the context of the federal courts.36 Over the last few 
decades, while an array of cases relating to LGBT inequality have regularly 
commanded the headlines,37 there have been precious few Supreme Court rulings 
on constitutional inequality claims pressed by poor persons qua poor persons, and 
none that got much national attention or were connected to an ongoing social 
movement. Any number of major decisions over that time period may, of course, 
be said to have powerful implications for low-income persons in contexts like 
voting rights,38 criminal law,39 immigration,40 and congressional power,41 to name 
35 For an insightful analysis on the decline of constitutional advocacy on behalf of 
poor people, see Julie A. Nice, Whither the Canaries: On the Exclusion of Poor People 
from Equal Constitutional Protection, 60 DRAKE L. REV. 1023, 1029–33 (2012), and Nice, 
supra note 11, at 629–36.  
36 For a discussion of constitutional claims in state courts, see infra Part II.B.  
37 In the last twenty years, for example, the Court has heard and decided eight major 
cases focusing on a constitutional issue related to LGBT equality—either a constitutional 
claim protecting LGBT’s or a constitutional claim seeking to limit the nondiscrimination 
protection afforded to LGBT’s: Hollingsworth v. Perry, 133 S. Ct. 2652 (2013); United 
States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013); Christian Legal Soc’y v. Martinez, 130 S. Ct. 
2971 (2010); Rumsfeld v. Forum for Academic & Institutional Rights, Inc. 547 U.S. 47 
(2006); Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003); Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640 
(2000); Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996); Hurley v. Irish-Am. Gay, Lesbian, & 
Bisexual Grp. of Boston, Inc., 515 U.S. 557 (1995).  
38 See generally, e.g., Shelby Cnty. v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2612 (2013) (striking down 
section 4 of the Voting Rights Act); Crawford v. Marion Cnty. Election Bd., 553 U.S. 181 
(2008) (upholding a state law requiring registered voters to present a valid government-
issued photo ID before casting a ballot).  
39 See generally, e.g., Salinas v. Texas, 133 S. Ct. 2174 (2013) (holding that a state 
may use silence in response to questioning as evidence of guilt in a criminal trial if the 
defendant fails to expressly invoke his Fifth Amendment privilege); Stephen B. Bright, 
Neither Equal nor Just: The Rationing and Denial of Legal Services to the Poor When Life 
and Liberty Are at Stake, 1997 ANN. SURV. AM. L. 783, 816 (1997) (arguing that Supreme 
Court cases subsequent to Gideon have “[made] a mockery of the right to counsel”); 
Richard Klein, The Emperor Gideon Has No Clothes: The Empty Promise of the 
Constitutional Right to Effective Assistance of Counsel, 13 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 625, 
640–41 (1986) (discussing Supreme Court decisions that have limited claims based on 
ineffective assistance of counsel). 
40 See generally, e.g., Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2492 (2012) (invalidating a 
state law that authorized local law enforcement officers to enforce national immigration 
laws); Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202 (1982) (striking down a state law denying education 
funding for undocumented immigrant children).  
41 See generally, e.g., Nat’l Fed. of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2608 
(2012) (holding that Commerce Clause did not give Congress authority to pass the 
Affordable Care Act under the Commerce Clause, and that Spending Clause did not 
authorize expansion of Medicaid in that Act)); United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 
(2000) (striking down a key provision of the Violence Against Women Act). 
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a few. But I can count only two Supreme Court rulings that have squarely 
presented constitutional equality claims focused on poverty.42  
It was not ever thus. In the unlikely event that I conceived of this paper topic 
in 1967, the “what constitutional movement” question would have been lodged in 
the opposite direction. The Stonewall riots did not even kick off the modern gay 
rights movement until 1969, and the Supreme Court’s most recent pronouncement 
on homosexuality, in a statutory interpretation case, gave no hint that change was 
on the judicial or political agenda. In Boutilier v. INS,43 the Court upheld the INS’s 
deportation of a gay man under a statutory provision barring entry to all 
immigrants “afflicted with psychopathic personality.”44 The agency interpreted 
that language to include all “homosexuals and sex perverts.”45 Ignoring affidavits 
from psychiatrists who knew Clive Boutilier and attested to the fact that he was 
well adjusted, the Court’s opinion concluded that “Congress used the phrase 
‘psychopathic personality’ not in the clinical sense, but to effectuate its purpose to 
exclude from entry all homosexuals and other sex perverts.”46  
By contrast, 1967 was a time of great activity, and seemed like one of great 
promise, for a movement asserting the rights of the poor. Michael Harrington’s 
Other America was published a few years earlier, in 1962. President Lyndon 
Johnson had declared the War on Poverty in his State of the Union address in 
1964, and this was followed by enactment of a number of significant pieces of 
federal antipoverty legislation in rapid succession. In the two years following 
President Johnson’s address, he aggressively supported, and Congress passed, for 
example, the Economic Opportunity Act of 1964,47 which created an Office of 
Economic Opportunity and led to creation of programs such as VISTA, the Job 
Corps, the predecessor to the Legal Services Corporation, Head Start, and many 
others; the Social Security Amendments of 1965,48 creating Medicaid and 
Medicare; the Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965,49 funding 
primary and secondary education and addressing educational access; and 
legislation creating the Department of Housing and Urban Development,50 among 
others. And, in an arresting contrast to the legislative politics of today, all this (and 
42 See generally Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489 (1999) (invalidating a state law where the 
welfare benefits received by new residents were limited for one year to the level paid in the 
former state of residence); M.L.B. v. S.L.J., 519 U.S. 102 (1996) (guaranteeing a trial 
transcript without fee in appeal on the termination of parental rights). 
43 387 U.S. 118 (1967). 
44 Id. at 118. 
45 Id. at 121. 
46 Id. at 122. 
47 Pub. L. No. 88-452, 78 Stat. 508. 
48 Pub. L. No. 89-97, 79 Stat. 375. 
49 Pub. L. No. 89-10, 79 Stat. 27. 
50 Housing and Urban Development Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-117, 79 Stat. 451. 
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more) was done at the same time Congress was enacting the landmark Civil Rights 
Act of 196451 and Voting Rights Act of 1965.52 
Organized movements involving poverty activists, and various political 
strategies seeking fundamental change, were in full swing.53 Both lawyers and law 
professors were actively engaged with these issues in this time frame. Welfare 
rights lawyers worked in coordinated (if not always smooth) advocacy for what 
lawyer Edward Sparer called a “right to live”—that is, guaranteed minimum 
benefits.54 Charles Reich’s The New Property appeared in the Yale Law Journal in 
1964.55 Well known for laying the groundwork for an expanded conception of 
property that triggered due-process protections, it also contained arguments that 
could be marshaled in support of an affirmative entitlement to subsistence 
benefits.56 Frank Michelman devoted his 1969 foreword to the Harvard Law 
Review’s Supreme Court issue to detailing the case for a minimum right of 
subsistence, grounded in the Constitution.57 He set out a theory that focused on 
deprivation and minimal provision rather than equality per se, but his focus was 
squarely on meaningfully addressing the plight of poor people.  
The Supreme Court had entered the arena as well. Building on a few key prior 
cases addressing the rights of indigent people in the context of interstate 
migration58 and access to the courts,59 a six-justice majority of the Supreme Court 
51 Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 244. 
52 Pub. L. No. 89-110, 79 Stat. 445. 
53 See generally Nat’l Welfare Rights Org. v. Wyman, 304 F. Supp. 134 (E.D.N.Y. 
1969) (challenging a state law that substantially reduced welfare benefits); RICHARD A. 
CLOWARD & FRANCES FOX PIVEN, POOR PEOPLE’S MOVEMENTS (1977); RICHARD A. 
CLOWARD & FRANCES FOX PIVEN, REGULATING THE POOR: THE FUNCTIONS OF PUBLIC 
WELFARE (1971); Richard A. Cloward & Frances Fox Piven, The Weight of the Poor: A 
Strategy To End Poverty, THE NATION, May 2, 1966, at 510 (articulating the “flood the 
system” strategy, which sought to hasten social and economic change by overwhelming the 
government bureaucracy with impossible demands).  
54 Edward V. Sparer, The Right to Welfare, in THE RIGHTS OF AMERICANS: WHAT 
THEY ARE—WHAT THEY SHOULD BE 65, 83–84 (Norman Dorsen ed., 1971) (arguing that 
constitutional “ground rules” guarantee a “right to live”). This movement is chronicled at 
length in MARTHA F. DAVIS, BRUTAL NEED: LAWYERS AND THE WELFARE RIGHTS 
MOVEMENT, 1960–1973 (1993); see also Edward S. & Jean C. Cahn, The War on Poverty: 
A Civilian Perspective, 73 YALE L.J. 1317 (1964) (calling for neighborhood lawyers to 
play an active role in the war on poverty). 
55 73 YALE L.J. 733 (1964).  
56 See ELIZABETH BUSSIERE, (DIS)ENTITLING THE POOR: THE WARREN COURT, 
WELFARE RIGHTS, AND THE AMERICAN POLITICAL TRADITION 97 n.29 (1997). 
57 See generally Frank I. Michelman, Foreword: On Protecting the Poor Through the 
Fourteenth Amendment, 83 HARV. L. REV. 7 (1969). For a contemporary reflection on, and 
reframing of, Michelman’s thesis, see generally Goodwin Liu, Rethinking Constitutional 
Welfare Rights, 61 STAN. L. REV. 203 (2008).  
58 See generally Edwards v. California, 314 U.S. 160 (1941) (striking down a law 
criminalizing the transportation of indigents into California). 
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in 1966 struck down Virginia’s poll tax and used language strongly suggesting that 
it was poised to hold wealth a suspect classification, as it had done for race. In 
Harper v. Virginia Board of Elections,60 the Court said: 
 
It is argued that a State may exact fees from citizens for many 
different kinds of licenses; that if it can demand from all an equal fee for 
a driver’s license, it can demand from all an equal poll tax for voting. But 
we must remember that the interest of the State, when it comes to voting, 
is limited to the power to fix qualifications. Wealth, like race, creed, or 
color, is not germane to one’s ability to participate intelligently in the 
electoral process. Lines drawn on the basis of wealth or property, like 
those of race are traditionally disfavored.61 
 
Despite this language, Harper’s other shoe never dropped. The Court did not go on 
to hold wealth a suspect classification. It did, however, take further steps toward 
according significant constitutional protection to the poor with two important 
decisions, both written by Justice Brennan.  
One was Shapiro v. Thompson,62 decided in 1969, which held that 
Connecticut’s one-year residency requirement for welfare benefits violated the 
Equal Protection Clause because it interfered with the “fundamental right of 
interstate movement” and could not be justified by its apparent goal to discourage 
indigent persons from moving to the state.63 Although the doctrinal focus of the 
case was the interest in interstate mobility, the reasoning emphasized the 
“creat[ion of] two classes of needy resident families indistinguishable from each 
other except that one is composed of residents who have resided [in the state] a 
year or more, and the second of residents who have resided [in the state] less than 
a year.”64 The Court further held that this was no basis for denying “welfare aid 
upon which may depend the ability of the families to obtain the very means to 
subsist—food, shelter, and other necessities of life.”65  
59 See generally Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609 (1965) (striking down a law 
preventing indigent criminal defendants from acquiring transcripts for appeal); Douglas v. 
California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963) (striking down a law denying court-appointed counsel on 
appeal from conviction). The “Griffin-Douglas” doctrine has spawned a jurisprudence of 
its own, permitting the government to require some fees, while invalidating others. It is 
grounded in a blend of equal-protection and due-process norms. The 1963 decision in 
Gideon was not cited by the Court in Harper and was not relevant as a doctrinal matter, but 
it was as important in terms of impact on poor people as anything else that happened in this 
time period.  
60 383 U.S. 663 (1966). 
61 Id. at 668 (emphasis added) (citations omitted).  
62 394 U.S. 618 (1969). 
63 Id. at 638. 
64 Id. at 627. 
65 Id. 
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Welfare rights advocates who were actively pursuing the goal of a “right to 
live” closely watched Shapiro.66 The case had been set for reargument in 1968 
after the Court found itself deadlocked. Archibald Cox was recruited to take over 
the case from the young welfare rights attorneys who had litigated it and argued it 
the first time. The decision generated a “euphoric reception”67 from welfare 
lawyers because it brought the concept of fundamental rights, and the strict 
scrutiny triggered by such rights, to the realm of poverty law. Welfare lawyers 
thought it might be a key first step on the way to the core right to subsistence. In 
this sense, Shapiro suggested themes that Michelman would press in his 
foreword, and, in fact, he found support for his argument in that opinion.68 
The other major victory came the next year when the Court decided 
Goldberg v. Kelly,69 a canonical case holding welfare benefits to be property 
interests for purposes of the Due Process Clause, and requiring welfare agencies 
to provide a hearing of some kind before terminating benefits. Though a 
procedural and not substantive case, the idea of benefits as a property interest, 
along with some of the language in Goldberg, provided further encouragement to 
the welfare rights movement that it was on its way to more substantive 
constitutional protection. Consider some of the language in Justice Brennan’s 
opinion about poverty—language virtually unthinkable today:  
 
From its founding, the Nation’s basic commitment has been to foster the 
dignity and well-being of all persons within its borders. We have come to 
recognize that forces not within the control of the poor contribute to their 
poverty. This perception, against the background of our traditions, has 
significantly influenced the development of the contemporary public 
assistance system. Welfare, by meeting the basic demands of subsistence, 
can help bring within the reach of the poor the same opportunities that 
are available to others to participate meaningfully in the life of the 
community. At the same time, welfare guards against the societal malaise 
that may flow from a widespread sense of unjustified frustration and 
insecurity. Public assistance, then, is not mere charity, but a means to 
“promote the general Welfare, and secure the Blessings of Liberty to 
ourselves and our Posterity.” The same governmental interests that 
counsel the provision of welfare, counsel as well its uninterrupted 
provision to those eligible to receive it; pre-termination evidentiary 
hearings are indispensable to that end.70  
 
66 See supra note 54 and accompanying text. 
67 DAVIS, supra note 54, at 80. 
68 Michelman, supra note 57, at 40–47. 
69 397 U.S. 254 (1970). 
70 Id. at 264–65 (citations omitted). 
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Soon after Goldberg, however, the air seemed to go out of the balloon. Two 
subsequent cases best capture what might now be seen as the turning point.71 The 
first, Dandridge v. Williams,72 was decided literally weeks after Goldberg and 
rejected a challenge to a state’s maximum family benefit—a ceiling imposed 
irrespective of the number of dependent children in the family. The second, San 
Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez,73 was decided in 1973 and 
rejected a constitutional challenge to the Texas school-funding scheme in which 
poorer districts received a fraction of the funding provided to more affluent ones. 
Both decisions came down during a time of change for the Court. Four 
appointees of President Richard Nixon took their seats between 1969 and 1971. 
The first—Justice Burger, replacing Justice Warren—was on the Court for both 
Dandridge and Rodriguez and voted with the majority in both cases. The 
remaining three—Justice Blackmun (replacing Justice Fortas), Justice Powell 
(replacing Justice Black), and Justice Rehnquist (replacing Justice Harlan)—were 
on the Court for Rodriguez. All voted to reject the constitutional claim, and Justice 
Powell wrote the majority opinion in Rodriguez. It is an open question how their 
predecessors would have voted in these cases, but there is little doubt that these 
appointments moved the Court in a more conservative direction, and that the 
rulings were broadly in sync with the judicial views pressed by President Nixon in 
his campaigns. 
71 For a fuller set of relevant cases before and after this time, see generally Plyler v. 
Doe, 457 U.S. 202 (1982) (striking down a state statute that denied public education to 
undocumented immigrant children); Lassiter v. Dep’t. of Soc. Serv., 452 U.S. 18 (1981) 
(holding that states are not required to provide appointment of counsel for indigent parents 
in every parental-status termination proceeding); Mem’l Hosp. v. Maricopa Cnty., 415 U.S. 
250 (1974) (striking down a state law requiring one year of residence as a condition of 
receiving nonemergency hospitalization or medical care at the county’s expense); Ross v. 
Moffitt, 417 U.S. 600 (1974) (holding that the rule requiring appointment of counsel for 
indigent state defendants on their first appeal would not be extended to discretionary state 
appeals); United States v. Kras, 409 U.S. 434 (1973) (upholding a statute that required 
petitioners in bankruptcy proceedings to pay court fees); Ortwein v. Schwab, 410 U.S. 656 
(1973) (upholding a court filing fee levied on poor persons seeking review of decisions by 
the state welfare division reducing their welfare payments); Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U.S. 
56 (1972) (rejecting due process challenge to a state procedure for eviction proceedings, 
while striking down a double bond requirement under equal protection); Jefferson v. 
Hackney, 406 U.S. 535 (1972) (upholding state’s differential methods for funding in 
different benefit programs); Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371 (1971) (holding due 
process prohibits a state from denying access to courts for marriage dissolution solely due 
to an inability to pay court fees); James v. Valtierra, 402 U.S. 137 (1971) (upholding a state 
law requiring voter approval for housing projects); King v. Smith, 392 U.S. 309 (1968) 
(holding that aid dispersed under the Aid to Families with Dependent Children could not be 
withheld because a “substitute father” visited the family on weekends).  
72 397 U.S. 471 (1970). 
73 411 U.S. 1 (1973). 
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Whereas Goldberg was about welfare procedures, Dandridge was about 
substantive benefits, and it was clear from the Dandridge opinion that the Court 
saw the two issues quite differently. The brief filed on behalf of the welfare 
recipients in Dandridge sought strict scrutiny, citing cases involving both 
fundamental rights and suspect classifications.74 Justice Stewart’s majority opinion 
in Dandridge emphatically rejected that idea. Although there was no analysis of 
the factors in footnote four of United States v. Carolene Products75 that have come 
to be part of heightened-scrutiny doctrine,76 Justice Stewart underscored that equal 
protection claims involving welfare policy would receive the lowest form of 
scrutiny. Noting that “the intractable economic, social, and even philosophical 
problems presented by public welfare assistance programs are not the business of 
this Court,”77 the opinion said that:  
 
the invalidation of state economic or social regulation as “overreaching” 
would be far too reminiscent of an era when the Court thought the 
Fourteenth Amendment gave it power to strike down state laws “because 
they may be unwise, improvident, or out of harmony with a particular 
school of thought.”78  
 
The reference to the Lochner era was clear, and in case there remained any doubt, 
the Court made its bottom line on standard of review explicit: 
 
To be sure, the cases cited, and many others enunciating this 
fundamental standard under the Equal Protection Clause, have in the 
main involved state regulation of business or industry. The 
administration of public welfare assistance, by contrast, involves the 
most basic economic needs of impoverished human beings. We 
recognize the dramatically real factual difference between the cited cases 
and this one, but we can find no basis for applying a different 
constitutional standard.79 
 
The lawyers working for the welfare rights movement had hoped that Dandridge 
would build on Shapiro and provide another meaningful step toward the “right to 
74 Brief for Appellees, Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471 (1970) (No. 131), 1969 
WL 119896, at *44.  
75 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938). 
76 See Jane S. Schacter, Ely at the Altar: Political Process Theory Through the Lens 
of the Marriage Debate, 109 MICH. L. REV. 1363, 1373 (2011) (noting that Graham v. 
Richardson in 1971 was the first time the Court expressly linked strict scrutiny to footnote 
four). 
77 Dandridge, 397 U.S. at 487. 
78 Id. at 484 (quoting Williamson v. Lee Optical of Oklahoma, Inc., 348 U.S. 483, 488 
(1955)). 
79 Id. at 485. 
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live” they had set as their goal. Instead, they were handed what they took to be an 
“unmitigated loss,”80 one that decisively undercut these hopes. 
The second major defeat came in 1973, when the Court, in Rodriguez, 
rejected a challenge to the Texas school financing system. That system relied 
heavily on local property taxes to fund education. The funding plan produced large 
interdistrict disparities in per-pupil educational spending, and there was a large gap 
between property-rich school districts and the property-poor school districts in 
which the Mexican American plaintiffs lived. The plaintiffs asserted two claims, 
each inspired to some degree by Harper. The first was that the system amounted to 
unconstitutional wealth discrimination and should be struck down, using strict 
scrutiny, as an impermissible classification based on wealth.81 The second was that 
it deprived students of their fundamental right to an education82—a right that, like 
the right to vote protected in Harper, could be seen as “preservative of other basic 
civil and political rights.”83 
When the Rodriguez case was filed in 1968, the idea of challenging school-
funding schemes was still relatively new. An influential article authored by three 
law professors—John Coons, William Clune, and Stephen Sugarman—appeared 
the next year and argued for a principle of wealth neutrality in state educational 
finance systems.84 Their proposed principle was designed in anticipation of 
institutional objections to judicial involvement in this sphere. It proposed to bar as 
unconstitutionally discriminatory the use of local school-district wealth as a basis 
for funding, while leaving states to determine another way to structure their 
school-finance plans.  
When the Rodriguez litigation began, lawsuits were also initiated in California 
and Illinois. The California litigation produced a major victory when the California 
Supreme Court, in the first of many chapters of Serrano v. Priest,85 struck down 
California’s school funding system. Applying both the Equal Protection Clause in 
the Fourteenth Amendment and the analogous state constitutional provision, the 
court found wealth a suspect classification and also identified a fundamental 
interest in education that independently triggered strict scrutiny.86 The decision 
attracted national attention and inspired new constitutional litigation in state courts 
around the country. And, only a few months after Serrano, the three-judge court in 
80 DAVIS, supra note 54, at 132. 
81 Brief for Appellees at 8, 37–39, San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 
U.S. 1 (1973) (No. 71-1332). 
82 Id.  
83 Harper v. Va. Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 667 (1966). 
84 John E. Coons et al., Educational Opportunity: A Workable Constitutional Test for 
State Financial Structures, 57 CALIF. L. REV. 305, 419–20 (1969).  
85 487 P.2d 1241 (1971). 
86 Id. at 1250, 1258. 
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Rodriguez v. San Antonio Independent School District87 followed the California 
Supreme Court’s blueprint in striking down the Texas system.88 
These claims, however, were all rejected by the Supreme Court.89 Rodriguez 
is often cited for the proposition that wealth is not a suspect classification, but that 
is not quite what Justice Powell’s opinion said.90 The Court found that the Texas 
system did not classify based on wealth at all, because of the possibility that poorer 
citizens could live in districts with richer tax bases (such as districts with industrial 
property).91 Still, it is clear enough from Justice Powell’s papers that he had the 
larger issue in mind. His notes include this provocative reference: “In a free 
enterprise society . . . we could hardly hold that wealth is suspect. This is 
communist doctrine but is not even accepted (except in a limited sense) in socialist 
countries.”92  
Justice Powell, who had served on local and state boards of education in 
Virginia, also rejected the idea that there is any federal constitutional right to 
education and appealed to the localist tradition in education.93 He also emphasized 
that the Texas funding system, in any event, did not absolutely deprive any student 
of access to school.94 In this way, the Rodriguez ruling was a powerful repudiation 
of core arguments in the constitutional movement to address poverty.  
 
II.  WHAT THE CONTRASTING HISTORIES SUGGEST ABOUT THE DYNAMICS OF 
CONSTITUTIONAL EQUALITY CLAIMS 
 
A.  Politics, Public Opinion, and Constitutional Law 
 
Normative disputes about constitutional interpretation aside, it is relatively 
uncontroversial to say that the Supreme Court has often moved in sync with public 
opinion. This is not true for all constitutional issues, but it can be seen in the realm 
87 337 F. Supp. 280 (W.D. Tex. 1971). 
88 Id. at 285–86. 
89 San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 28–29, 37 (1973). 
90 For a careful tracing of how the Court’s failure to endorse the proffered wealth-as-
a-suspect-classification claim morphed, over time, into the erroneous idea that the Court 
had considered and explicitly rejected that claim, see Nice, supra note 35, at 1029–49.  
91 Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 23 (“[T]here is reason to believe that the poorest families 
are not necessarily clustered in the poorest property districts.”). 
92 Richard Schragger, San Antonio v. Rodriguez and the Legal Geography of School 
Finance Reform, in CIV. RTS. STORIES 85, 99 (Myriam E. Gilles & Risa L. Goluboff eds., 
2008).  
93 Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 40 (“We are asked to condemn the State’s judgment in 
conferring on political subdivisions the power to tax local property to supply revenues for 
local interests. In so doing, appellees would have the Court intrude in an area in which it 
has traditionally deferred to state legislatures. This Court has often admonished against 
such interferences . . . .”). 
94 Deprivation of access to school was absolute in the later decision of Plyler v. Doe, 
457 U.S. 202 (1982). 
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of various debates about inequality.95 This is not a new or revolutionary idea—
certainly not to political scientists96—but it has become more mainstream in legal 
scholarship over time.97 It becomes far more controversial when stated in terms of 
the causal effect of public opinion on the Court, or vice versa, but the descriptive 
alignment on many issues is there to be seen.  
To be sure, there will always be controversies about what polls measure and 
how to conceive of the relevant public opinion. Nevertheless, there is evidence of 
alignment between public attitudes and the Supreme Court’s major decisions on 
LGBT issues. If one consulted surveys of opinion on the issues decided in Romer 
in 1996 (banning antidiscrimination protections for LGBTs),98 Lawrence in 2003 
(criminalizing sodomy),99 and Windsor in 2013 (same-sex marriage),100 one would 
95 For an issue-by-issue breakdown that shows different patterns of public opinion 
support for constitutional decisions in different contexts, see Nathaniel Persily, 
Introduction, in PUBLIC OPINION AND CONSTITUTIONAL CONTROVERSY 3, 5–7 (Nathaniel 
Persily et al. eds., 2008).  
96 See generally Robert A. Dahl, Decision-Making in a Democracy: The Supreme 
Court as a National Policy-Maker, 6 J. PUB. L. 279 (1957) (explaining widely held view 
among political scientists that the Supreme Court is a national policy maker). 
97 See, e.g., BARRY FRIEDMAN, THE WILL OF THE PEOPLE: HOW PUBLIC OPINION HAS 
INFLUENCED THE SUPREME COURT AND SHAPED THE MEANING OF THE CONSTITUTION 381 
(2009) (“The justices in Brown v. Board of Education argued they were protecting 
constitutional rights, but once again it was evolving national views that supported the 
Court’s judgment and enabled its enforcement.”); Michael J. Klarman, Rethinking the Civil 
Rights and Civil Liberties Revolutions, 82 VA. L. REV. 1, 67 (1996) (“By the time Roe was 
decided in 1973, public opinion on the abortion issue had already been dramatically 
transformed . . . . Seventeen states had recently passed legislation liberalizing their abortion 
regulations.”). Cf. Robert Post & Reva Siegel, Roe Rage: Democratic Constitutionalism 
and Backlash, 42 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 373, 391 (2007) (discussing the theory that “the 
Court broadly reflects society, so its chief tendency is ‘to constitutionalize consensus and 
suppress outliers’” (quoting MICHAEL J. KLARMAN, FROM JIM CROW TO CIVIL RIGHTS: THE 
SUPREME COURT AND THE STRUGGLE FOR RACIAL EQUALITY 449 (2004))); Gerald N. 
Rosenberg, The 1964 Civil Rights Act: The Crucial Role of Social Movements in the 
Enactment and Implementation of Anti-Discrimination Law, 49 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 1147, 
1147–49 (2004) (rebutting the “conventional story” that “the 1964 Civil Rights was largely 
a result of the 1954 Brown decision”). 
98 See, e.g., Gay and Lesbian Rights, GALLUP (Mar. 31, 2014, 3:45 PM), http://www. 
gallup.com/poll/1651/gay-lesbian-rights.aspx#3 (reflecting that Gallup polling on “equal 
rights in terms of job opportunities” for gay people showed a rise from 56% support in 
1977 to 84% in November 1996, a few months after Romer was decided). The anti-gay-
rights initiative invalidated in Romer went beyond the realm of employment, and there are 
questions about how people would have understood this poll question. Nevertheless, there 
was strong support for “equal rights” in one of the main arenas affected by Amendment 2.  
99 See, e.g., Patrick J. Egan et al., Gay Rights, in PUBLIC OPINION AND 
CONSTITUTIONAL CONTROVERSY 235, 241 (Jack Citrin et al. eds., 2008). The authors also 
addressed the reverse question—the effect of Lawrence on subsequent public opinion—
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find rising public support for the rights at issue in those cases. This general theme 
has been stressed in scholarship on LGBT issues, with the rise over time of public 
support for LGBT equality.101 This rise in support was especially pronounced 
during the first fifteen years or so of the modern same-sex-marriage movement—
roughly from 1993 to 2008. During this period, many observers lamented the 
policy backlash triggered by litigation to secure marriage equality and cited it as 
the inevitable byproduct of courts—in that case, state courts—getting too far ahead 
of the public.102 The current state of public opinion on same-sex marriage, in 
which polls now commonly register majority support for marriage equality, has 
likewise been a regular part of analysis of Windsor.103 Lurking underneath 
statements of this kind is often an implicit kind of progressive historical 
triumphalism—that is, the idea that courts will catch up to the public and then take 
their place on the slow but steady road of progress toward meaningful equality. 
That may or may not prove true in the context of LGBT rights, but it has by no 
means proven universally true.104 One needs to look no further than the recent 
Shelby County v. Holder105 decision to see some evidence to the contrary. 
The trajectory of the constitutional movement pressing the rights of the poor 
plainly supports no triumphalist narrative—quite the contrary. Indeed, at first 
blush, rather than reflecting an area in which the Supreme Court moved after 
public opinion and the political process moved, it might seem a bit of the reverse. 
After all, the political process was actively engaged in the War on Poverty in the 
mid-1960s. The President was highly vocal, and large congressional majorities 
were passing, at a brisk pace, ambitious federal antipoverty legislation.106 This was 
all taking place at about the time Harper was decided (1965) and only a few years 
before Shapiro (1969). This quality and quantity of activity might seem to 
evidence political and public support for a robust public response to poverty.  
and, interestingly, found that the Lawrence decision temporarily “disrupted the upward 
trend in public opinion.” Id. 
100 See, e.g., Gay Marriage: Key Data Points from Pew Research, PEW RES. CTR. 
(June 11, 2013), http://www.pewresearch.org/key-data-points/gay-marriage-key-data-point 
s-from-pew-research (finding that in 2013, 50% of Americans supported gay marriage 
while 43% opposed it); Jeffrey M. Jones, Same-Sex Marriage Support Solidifies Above 
50% in U.S., GALLUP POL. (May 13, 2013), http://www.gallup.com/poll/162398/sex-marria 
ge-support-solidifies-above.aspx (showing that 53% of Americans believe the law should 
recognize same-sex marriages). 
101 See KLARMAN, supra note 16, at 211; Egan et al., supra note 99, at 237–41; 
Schacter, supra note 76, at 1388–89. 
102 See GERALD N. ROSENBERG, THE HOLLOW HOPE: CAN COURTS BRING ABOUT 
SOCIAL CHANGE? 339–54 (2d ed. 2008); Michael J. Klarman, Brown and Lawrence (and 
Goodridge), 104 MICH. L. REV. 431, 475 (2005).  
103 See Schacter, supra note 26, at 1199. 
104 See generally PERSILY, supra note 95 (exploring public opinion in different 
constitutional contexts). 
105 133 S. Ct. 2612 (2013) (striking down section 4 of the Voting Rights Act). 
106 See supra notes 47–52 and accompanying text. 
 
                                                     
2014] UNEQUAL INEQUALITIES? 883 
In other words, there are reasons to believe that the Court would not have 
been manifestly far ahead of the public or political process by deciding Dandridge 
differently or at least in building in some affirmative way on Harper or Shapiro. 
True, President Johnson was out of office when Dandridge was decided in 1970, 
and the “war” on poverty, as such, was over. But the presidential Commission on 
Income Maintenance Programs issued a report in 1969 supporting a “negative 
income tax.”107 That proposal competed with other plans in a thoroughly 
mainstream discussion about guaranteed income support. Some 1,300 economists 
from 150 different institutions had petitioned Congress in 1969 in support of a 
“national system of income guarantees and supplements.”108 These developments 
might well have been thought sufficient to create a judicial audience more 
sympathetic to robust protections for the poor. 
There are any number of potential ways to explain Dandridge and Rodriguez 
in terms of doctrine. The language in Harper that seemed on the edge of formally 
declaring wealth as a suspect classification could be limited by the context of 
voting, one that is arguably sui generis. And, striking down a poll tax in the 
context of voting is a long way from mandating subsistence payments or 
equalizing education finding. Similarly, despite their rhetorical flourishes, neither 
Shapiro nor Goldberg created an entitlement to benefits, standing alone. Shapiro 
addressed only withholding from new-residents benefits the state had already 
elected to give existing residents, and Goldberg concerned only hearing rights once 
an entitlement had been created by state law. And, perhaps the daunting 
institutional implications of constitutionalizing education funding or further 
constitutionalizing welfare benefits put a brake on any momentum that seemed to 
have taken hold with Harper and Shapiro. In short, both Dandridge and Rodriguez 
might simply have been more of a doctrinal stretch than they appeared to the 
plaintiffs’ lawyers—although it is worth noting that both cases had only five-vote 
majorities, so the lawyers’ aspirations were hardly fanciful.109 
107 On the negative income tax and associated proposals, see Felicia Kornbluh, Is 
Work the Only Thing that Pays? The Guaranteed Income and Other Alternative Anti-
Poverty Policies in Historical Perspective, 4 NW. J.L. & SOC. POL’Y 61, 66–68, 76–82 
(2009). On the difference between negative income tax and the earned income tax credit, 
see Jesse Rothstein, Is the EITC as Good as an NIT? Conditional Cash Transfers and Tax 
Incidence, 2 AM. ECON. J.: ECON. POL’Y 177, 177–78 (2010). 
108 Richard K. Caputo, United States of America: GAI Almost in the 1970s but 
Downhill Thereafter, in BASIC INCOME GUARANTEE AND POLITICS: INTERNATIONAL 
EXPERIENCES AND PERSPECTIVES ON THE VIABILITY OF INCOME GUARANTEE 265, 266 
(Richard K. Caputo ed., 2012) (quoting Economists Urge Assured Income, N.Y. TIMES, 
May 28, 1968, at 1). The larger discussion included even Milton Friedman, who authored a 
proposal of this kind in 1962. See MILTON FRIEDMAN, CAPITALISM AND FREEDOM 190–96 
(1962). 
109 Decided April 6, 1970, Dandridge was only 5-3, not 5-4, because Justice 
Blackmun had not yet been sworn in. Harry A. Blackmun, THE OYEZ PROJECT AT IIT 
CHICAGO-KENT C. OF L., http://www.oyez.org/justices/harry_a_blackmun (last visited May 
6, 2014). 
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The more important point I would like to press is that, examined more closely, 
the poverty cases are consistent with the idea that courts often move in sync with 
the political process and public opinion. There are, at the threshold, some grounds 
to question whether President Johnson’s War on Poverty had solid political and 
public support even at the time it was being waged.110 And, as race tensions began 
to rise in the mid-1960s, opposition began to consolidate and crystallize.111  
A few specific points about the links between race and poverty deserve 
emphasis. The first relates to welfare policy. There is a longstanding fault line in 
public opinion about antipoverty programs that is consistent with Dandridge and 
would, in fact, predict the decision’s result. Polling over time shows majorities 
consistently supportive of the idea that government should do more to assist the 
poor but quite hostile to welfare programs.112 One way to reconcile this apparent 
inconsistency is to interpret it as reflecting public support for spending more public 
funds to help individual poor persons find jobs but hostility for categorical income 
support.113 Another is to map these attitudes onto a longstanding conceptual 
distinction in public understanding of poverty that separates the “deserving” from 
the “undeserving” poor. Michele Landis Dauber’s work about New Deal 
constitutionalism shows this distinction at work in the context of disaster relief,114 
and Joel Handler examines it in the context of Aid to Families with Dependent 
Children and its predecessor programs.115 Relatedly, there is evidence that public 
attitudes about welfare have been profoundly shaped by race, or beliefs about race. 
Public reaction to the rise in antipoverty programs unfolded against a history of 
large-scale migration of blacks from the south to the urban north, and it became 
particularly salient in the mid-1960s, as race riots began to erupt and controversies 
over spending funds from the War on Poverty increasingly appeared in the 
media.116 In The Color of Welfare, sociologist Jill Quadagno traces the 
entwinement of race and welfare policy over time and argues that the War on 
Poverty was itself conceived, in part, with race in mind, and then thwarted by 
110 Amitai Etzioni, Consensus and Reforms in the “Great Society”, 40 SOC. INQUIRY 
113, 113 (1970) (“Great Society slogans aroused aspirations and hopes which previously 
were either dormant or nonexistent. And, most power groups were aligned against most of 
the specific programs, while few were mobilized in their favor.”) (emphasis omitted). 
111 See id. at 115. 
112 MARTIN GILENS, WHY AMERICANS HATE WELFARE: RACE, MEDIA, AND THE 
POLITICS OF ANTIPOVERTY POLICY 29–39 (1999); Hazel Erskine, The Polls: Government 
Role in Welfare, 39 PUB. OPINION Q. 257, 257 (1975). 
113 See id. at 31–39. 
114 MICHELE LANDIS DAUBER, THE SYMPATHETIC STATE: DISASTER RELIEF AND THE 
ORIGINS OF THE AMERICAN WELFARE STATE 13–16 (2013). 
115 See JOEL F. HANDLER, REFORMING THE POOR: WELFARE POLICY, FEDERALISM, 
AND MORALITY 1–4 (1972); JOEL F. HANDLER & ELLEN JANE HOLLINGSWORTH, THE 
“DESERVING POOR”: A STUDY OF WELFARE ADMINISTRATION 1–11 (1971). 
116 GILENS, supra note 112, at 116–21. 
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racial dynamics in the country.117 In his 1999 book Why Americans Hate Welfare, 
political scientist Martin Gilens finds that perceptions of poverty became 
increasingly racialized starting in the mid-1960s.118 Based on comprehensive 
analysis of public-opinion data, and content analysis of media coverage of poverty 
over time, Gilens shows that media photographs in the many stories about poor 
people during this time increasingly featured blacks.119 This coincided with more 
and more Americans seeing poverty as essentially a black problem, and with rising 
opposition to welfare as an unwise subsidy to the undeserving poor.120 Gilens 
likewise mines polling data and finds strong support for the conclusion that 
stereotypical negative attitudes about blacks, and an associated belief that welfare 
beneficiaries were not deserving, reflected “central elements in generating public 
opposition to welfare.”121  
Looking at public opinion with all of these complex undercurrents in mind, 
then, Dandridge does not look at all out of sync with public attitudes. Indeed, it 
might be the willingness of the Court in Shapiro to hold as it did that seems more 
the anomaly.122 
Moving from welfare to school finance, there are reasons to think that racial 
dynamics may also have helped shape public attitudes in that context. Here, 
however, the historical evidence of public opinion is limited, so this remains more 
hypothesis than argument. I have been unable to find much on public attitudes 
toward inequality in school finance at or around the time of Rodriguez. But there 
are two suggestive studies in later time periods, though neither involved a large 
sample. One 1991 study of attitudes surrounding school finance reform in Texas, 
for example, found that attitudes about race played a significant role in shaping 
survey respondents’ views about school-finance reform, irrespective of whether the 
117 JILL S. QUADAGNO, THE COLOR OF WELFARE: HOW RACISM UNDERMINED THE 
WAR ON POVERTY 3–5 (1994). 
118 GILENS, supra note 112, at 114–32. 
119 Id.  
120 Id.  
121 Id. at 92. 
122 And, in a sense, that anomaly persists beyond Shapiro and Dandridge. In 1999, at 
a time when welfare had long been under siege and had been fundamentally changed on the 
federal level with welfare reform, the Supreme Court decided Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489 
(1999). In Saenz, the Court both reframed the Shapiro right (by moving it from the Equal 
Protection Clause to the Privileges or Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment) 
and expanded it (by barring a California state law that did not deny benefits to new 
residents but did limit them to their former state’s benefit level for the first year of 
residence). Id. at 500–11. The Saenz ruling was surprising, largely because it seemed to 
revive a clause of the Fourteenth Amendment that had been dead since the Slaughterhouse 
Cases in 1873. See id. at 511–13 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting). It might also be seen as 
surprising in light of the trajectory of public policy toward welfare and public attitudes 
toward welfare programs. As with Shapiro, though, Saenz was a limited ruling and did not 
approach any free-standing entitlement to benefits. 
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reform would financially help or hurt the respondent’s own district.123 This same 
study, along with another survey done in New Jersey in 1990,124 also found that 
whites had an exaggerated view of the extent to which school finance reform 
would benefit blacks, in particular.125  
Moreover, it is quite plausible to think that ideas about race would play a role 
in shaping public opinion in this area because issues about race and schools were 
very much in the air, principally in disputes about busing and desegregation. The 
link becomes apparent if we restate the Rodriguez issue at a higher level of 
generality—whether, say, courts ought to disturb the relative autonomy of 
suburban schools because of concerns about urban schools. If understood in those 
terms, we can easily see why public opinion about school finance in 1973 might be 
intertwined with, or affected by, attitudes about desegregation and busing. In 1972, 
busing was registering only 20% support among all respondents in a poll—and this 
was up from 14% in 1970.126 President Nixon had made opposition to busing a 
signature part of his election appeals in 1968 and 1972.127 By 1973, with four 
Nixon appointees seated, the Court was in the midst of a transition in its busing 
jurisprudence. It was moving away from the broad remedial discretion approved in 
the 1971 decision, Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Election.128 The 
1973 decision in Keyes v. School District No. 1129 emphasized the centrality of the 
de jure-de facto distinction, and the 1974 decision in Milliken v. Bradley130 barred 
interdistrict remedies in the absence of proof of an interdistrict violation. Against 
this background, and with the limited evidence available in mind, there are reasons 




123 See Kent L. Tedin, Self-Interest, Symbolic Values, and the Financial Equalization 
of the Public Schools, 56 J. POL. 628, 640 (1994). 
124 See Douglas S. Reed, Twenty-Five Years After Rodriguez: School Finance 
Litigation and the Impact of the New Judicial Federalism, 32 L. & SOC’Y REV. 175, 209–12 
(1998); Tedin, supra note 123, at 634 & n.18. 
125 In Texas, for example, many more Hispanics would have benefited. Tedin, supra 
note 123, at 634–39. In general, minority districts are not always the most underfunded. 
James E. Ryan, The Influence of Race in School Finance Litigation, 98 MICH. L. REV. 432, 
433–36 (1999).  
126 Michael Murakami, Desegregation, in PUBLIC OPINION AND CONSTITUTIONAL 
CONTROVERSY 18, 35–36 (Jack Citron et al. eds., 2008). Murakami noted that support 
increased substantially over time but that it still stood well below majority—at 38%—in 
1996. Id. 
127 See KEVIN J. MCMAHON, NIXON’S COURT 232–40 (2011) (arguing that opposition 
to busing and Warren Court criminal procedure decisions were President Nixon’s major 
priorities for the Supreme Court).  
128 401 U.S. 1 (1971). 
129 413 U.S. 189 (1973). 
130 418 U.S. 717 (1974). 
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B.  The Significant Role of State Courts 
 
I have been focusing here on the role of the U.S. Supreme Court, but neither 
constitutional movement can be fully understood without accounting for the role of 
state courts, applying state constitutions. There are some notable temporal 
distinctions in the two contexts, but they do not negate the main point that state 
courts have been a force to be reckoned with in relation to these constitutional 
movements. In the context of LGBT and at least some poverty-related rights, the 
“parity” debate that was once triggered by Justice Brennan’s call for a more robust 
state constitutionalism131 seems to have been answered in the affirmative by 
examples of state courts acting where federal courts have not—or have not yet.  
In the LGBT context, the most vivid example of state courts outpacing their 
federal counterparts is in the marriage domain. It was the Hawaii Supreme Court 
that was the first to act on a claim of marriage equality in the early 1990s. For the 
next fifteen years, constitutional marriage equality litigation was, by design, filed 
only in state courts.132 Between 1993, when Hawaii decided Baehr v. Lewin,133 and 
2013, when the Supreme Court decided Windsor and Perry,134 a number of state 
supreme courts decided state constitutional marriage-equality claims, with more of 
them ruling in favor of marriage equality or mandating civil unions than rejecting 
the claims.135 The deliberate decision to confine marriage litigation to state courts 
largely held until the Olson-Boies team went to federal court in 2009—over the 
objection of LGBT rights groups—to challenge Prop 8.136 The motivation for 
avoiding the federal courts was not a subtle one; the fear was of going to the 
Supreme Court too early and risking an adverse precedent.137 
The role of the state courts is clearest in the marriage context, but it began 
before that. Between the time when Bowers upheld the Georgia sodomy law 
(1986)138 and Lawrence struck down the Texas ban (2003),139 four state supreme 
131 William J. Brennan, Jr., State Constitutions and the Protection of Individual 
Rights, 90 HARV. L. REV. 489, 491 (1977); Burt Neuborne, The Myth of Parity, 90 HARV. 
L. REV. 1105, 1105–06 (1977). For more contemporary perspectives on what some call the 
new judicial federalism, see generally JAMES A. GARDNER, INTERPRETING STATE 
CONSTITUTIONS: A JURISPRUDENCE OF FUNCTION IN A FEDERAL SYSTEM 24–25 (2005) 
(commenting on Justice Brennan’s call for more robust state constitutionalism) and 
ROBERT F. WILLIAMS, THE LAW OF AMERICAN STATE CONSTITUTIONS (2009) (same).  
132 Schacter, supra note 26, at 1199. 
133 852 P.2d 44 (Haw. 1993). 
134 133 S. Ct. 2652 (2013). 
135 See generally KLARMAN, supra note 16 (tracing gay marriage litigation through 
2012); Schacter, supra note 16, at 1164–74, 1189 (tracing same-sex marriage cases through 
2009).  
136 See KLARMAN, supra note 16, at 138.  
137 Gabriel Arana, Gay on Trial: After State-Level Defeats, Lawyers Are Taking the 
Case for Gay Rights to Federal Court, THE AM. PROSPECT (Nov. 20, 2009), http://prospect. 
org/article/gay-trial. 
138 Id. at 195–96. 
 
                                                     
888 UTAH LAW REVIEW [NO.4 
courts struck down criminal sodomy bans under their state’s constitution. 
Improbably enough, these were the supreme courts of Kentucky, Arkansas, 
Montana, and Georgia itself.140 These courts joined the state supreme courts that 
had already overturned sodomy laws before Bowers.141 
The area where state courts have played the most active role in the realm of 
poverty is with respect to educational funding. Unlike in the case of same-sex 
marriage, this role was not a proactive strategy to avoid the Supreme Court. 
Indeed, the landmark California state court litigation in Serrano was filed the same 
year that Rodriguez was filed in federal court, and the sweeping Serrano opinion 
provided a blueprint for the federal district court decision in Rodriguez that ruled 
Texas’s system unconstitutional. Interestingly, while Serrano was big national 
news and inspired some other state cases to be filed around the country, it did not 
have the same rapid-fire nationalizing effect as the Hawaii Supreme Court’s 1993 
decision portending imminent legalization of same-sex marriage for the first 
time.142 Some of this may be explained by the fact that there was (in Rodriguez) 
already a federal case in the pipeline and thus a foreseeable date when the U.S. 
Supreme Court might rule on the school-finance question. In addition, the Burger 
Court’s halt of the Warren Court’s trajectory was still young and coming into view, 
so the very idea of strategic avoidance of the Supreme Court was not yet part of the 
left’s litigation calculus. 
There are, moreover, many factors specific to marriage equality that can 
explain why same-sex marriage so quickly became a national issue. One is the 
issue of interstate marriage recognition, which made the actions of one state 
potentially relevant to the remaining forty-nine. Another is that the supporters and 
opponents of gay rights were already fully mobilized and active by 1993, so the 
Hawaii decision was a little like throwing something highly flammable into an 
active fire.143 By contrast, it would appear that supporters and opponents of 
equalizing state school-finance systems got somewhat organized and mobilized 
because of rulings like Serrano and Rodriguez, rather than having been so before 
them. The same-sex marriage issue also had a pronounced partisan divide from the 
outset. This is somewhat true of school finance cases, but less so. To the extent that 
school finance lawsuits might generally be associated with racial integration of the 
schools and especially busing, that issue had a partisan skew that was made 
139 Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578–79 (2003). 
140 See generally Jegley v. Picado, 80 S.W.3d 332 (Ark. 2002); Powell v. State, 510 
S.E.2d 18 (Ga. 1998); Gryczan v. State, 942 P.2d 112 (Mont. 1997); Commonwealth v. 
Wasson, 842 S.W.2d 487 (Ky. 1992). During this period, one state court upheld a sodomy 
ban, see State v. Smith, 766 So.2d 501 (La. 2000).  
141 People v. Onofre, 415 N.E.2d 936, 943 (N.Y. 1980); Commonwealth v. Bonadio, 
415 A.2d 47, 51–52 (Pa. 1980). 
142 The rapid nationalization of the same-sex marriage movement is reviewed in 
Schacter, supra note 16, at 109. 
143 Id. at 1212–16, 1165–66.  
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apparent in the 1968 and 1972 elections.144 But still, there was not, in 1973, the 
same fully elaborated structure of political conflict on education finance as there 
was about busing and the aggressive pursuit of school desegregation.  
In any event, the state courts ultimately emerged as the principal venue for 
educational-finance litigation. But the emergence came after Rodriguez, not—as in 
the case of marriage—before the Supreme Court ever ruled. Only one other 
Serrano-type case was filed before Rodriguez—in New Jersey, and it produced a 
victory for the plaintiffs in the state.145 After Rodriguez, though, litigation was 
filed in several additional states. This litigation came in waves. Between 1973 and 
1989, with the coordination of a national “equity network” funded by the Ford 
Foundation and others, lawsuits focusing on equality in school finance were filed 
in nineteen additional states.146 Six were victorious for plaintiffs, but thirteen were 
not.147 In 1989, however, a landmark ruling in Kentucky, Rose v. Council for 
Better Education, Inc.,148 brought a new kind of educational finance case—one 
focusing on educational adequacy rather than equality, and involving more 
innovation in remedies.149 Overall, educational finance lawsuits have reached the 
high courts of forty-three states and have produced twenty-six victories and 
seventeen losses for plaintiffs.150 How to define “victory” and “defeat” in this 
context is not as simple as it may sound, and there are debates ongoing about 
precisely what impact these victories will have on educational outcomes for 
children.151 Unquestionably, however, since 1989, there has been a post-Rodriguez 
national constitutional movement that has targeted state courts, relied on education 
clauses in state constitutions, and secured relief in roughly two-thirds of the cases.  
 
 
144 MCMAHON, supra note 127, at 233–40; David O. Sears et al., Whites’ Opposition 
to “Busing”: Self-Interest or Symbolic Politics?, 73 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 369, 378–80 
(1979). 
145 See generally Robinson v. Cahill, 303 A.2d 273 (N.J. 1973). The original 
complaint in Cahill was filed in 1970. See Robert Hanley, Spirit of ‘76: Byrne’s School 
Parity Battle Still Reverberates, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 17, 1996, http://www.nytimes.com/1996 
/11/17/nyregion/spirit-of-76-byrne-s-school-parity-battle-still-reverberates.html. 
146 MICHAEL PARIS, FRAMING EQUAL OPPORTUNITY: LAW AND THE POLITICS OF 
SCHOOL FINANCE REFORM 45 (2010). 
147 Id.; see also Michael A. Rebell, Educational Adequacy, Democracy, and the 
Courts, in ACHIEVING HIGH EDUCATIONAL STANDARDS FOR ALL: CONFERENCE SUMMARY 
218, 227 (Timothy Ready et al. eds., 2002) (noting that the majority of state supreme courts 
denied relief to the plaintiffs). 
148 790 S.W.2d 186 (Ky. 1989). 
149 See PARIS, supra note 146, at 45–46; William S. Koski, The Evolving Role of the 
Courts in School Reform Twenty Years After Rose, 98 KY. L.J. 789, 789–91 (2010); Rebell, 
supra note 147, at 228–36.  
150 PARIS, supra note 146, at 46.  
151 William S. Koski, Courthouses vs. Statehouses?, 109 MICH. L. REV. 923, 927, 
930–38 (2011). 
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C.  The Limits of the Traditional Tiers of Scrutiny 
 
Finally, tracking the Supreme Court’s experience with poverty and sexual 
orientation reflects both significant transitions in—and problems with—the tiers of 
scrutiny, and again reveals some important dynamics in contemporary 
constitutional approaches to inequality.  
The Court’s doctrinal approach to major equal-protection debates about race 
and gender has, in both cases, been heavily bound up with the traditional three tiers 
of scrutiny. In the case of race, the sharpest doctrinal disputes have concerned how 
to apply the tiers of scrutiny to plans crafted to benefit racial minorities, like 
affirmative action152 or school desegregation plans.153 In the context of gender, the 
disputes have focused on what constitutes a “real difference” that justifies 
differential treatment of the sexes,154 along with different understandings about 
how rigorous the prescribed level of scrutiny for gender distinctions is supposed to 
be.155  
Language in many of the Court’s equality cases continues to refer to tiers of 
scrutiny—said to encompass strict, intermediate, and rational basis—and law 
students must dutifully learn the framework. But the Court has not designated a 
new class or classification for formally heightened scrutiny in decades, and the 
tiers have broken down in any number of ways.156 At the time of Dandridge (1970) 
and Rodriguez (1973), equal protection was generally viewed in terms of two 
tiers—strict scrutiny or rational basis. What we now call intermediate scrutiny 
(principally used in gender cases) did not emerge formally until 1976 with Craig v. 
Boren.157 The criteria for strict scrutiny that are now regularly cited as part of the 
doctrine were still emerging when Dandridge was decided. In fact, it was another 
welfare case, this one involving the denial of welfare benefits to legally resident 
aliens,158 that helped to sharpen these doctrinal criteria by first linking them to the 
152 See, e.g., Fisher v. Univ. of Tx., 133 S. Ct. 2411 (2013); Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 
U.S. 244 (2003); Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003); Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. 
Peña, 515 U.S. 200 (1995); Metro Broad., Inc. v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547 (1990); City of 
Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469 (1989); Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 
438 U.S. 265 (1978). 
153 See, e.g., Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701 
(2007). 
154 See, e.g., Michael M. v. Superior Court of Sonoma Cnty., 450 U.S. 464 (1981); 
Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484 (1974). 
155 Compare Nguyen v. INS, 533 U.S. 53, 61 (2001) (upholding a statute that imposed 
a higher standard for U.S. citizenship to be assigned to a child born abroad out of wedlock 
to an American parent if that parent was the child’s father, rather than mother), with United 
States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 519 (1996) (striking down the Virginia Military Institute’s 
male-only admission policy).  
156 See generally Suzanne B. Goldberg, Equality Without Tiers, 77 SO. CAL. L REV. 
481 (2004). 
157 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976). 
158 See Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 367–68, 372 (1971).  
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canonical idea of “discrete and insular minorities” contained in footnote four of 
United States v. Carolene Products Co.159 The doctrine continued to be 
consolidated and refined and appeared as a tidy black letter list in Rodriguez, 
where the Court characterized the “traditional indicia of suspectness” as whether 
the affected class is “saddled with such disabilities, or subjected to such a history 
of purposeful unequal treatment, or relegated to such a position of political 
powerlessness as to command extraordinary protection from the majoritarian 
political process.”160 A few weeks after Rodriguez, Justice Brennan wrote a 
plurality in Frontiero v. Richardson161 in which he argued that gender distinctions 
should be subjected to strict scrutiny.162 He fell a vote short of a majority.163 In that 
opinion, he included immutability as a relevant criterion.164 While it has never 
been formally required by the Court, it sometimes appears on the list of 
requirements.  
In some ways, poverty and sexual orientation have posed similar conceptual 
problems for the standard approach to heightened scrutiny, but in others the two 
categories of cases have diverged. Let me begin with the divergence, which 
underscores a major change over time in the court’s approach to equal protection. 
Recall that in Dandridge, the court was operating in a context in which scrutiny 
was more like an on-off switch. Either strict scrutiny was triggered or the court 
defaulted to the relaxed and highly deferential rationality review employed in 
ordinary cases of economic regulation.165 The Court chose the latter, quite 
explicitly. One might say about Dandridge—as Professor Julie Nice has lucidly 
emphasized—that, instead of focusing on the abject political powerlessness of poor 
people along every dimension, and assimilating poverty cases to footnote four of 
Carolene Products, the court instead assimilated poverty to the Lochner era and 
the problems raised by close scrutiny of matters economic in nature.166 There was 
no apparent consideration in Dandridge of either a formal level of scrutiny in 
between strict scrutiny and rational basis, nor of the idea that rationality review 
itself might be calibrated differently for the case. This was true in Rodriguez, as 
well, although there the inquiry was clouded by whether the classification of 
districts was one based on individual wealth at all.167 But here again, there was no 
exploration of a different version of rational basis. 
159 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938). 
160 San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 28 (1973).  
161 411 U.S. 677 (1973). 
162 See id. at 688. 
163 See id. at 678. 
164 See id. at 686. 
165 See, e.g., Williamson v. Lee Optical Co., 348 U.S. 483, 485, 491 (1955). 
166 See Nice, supra note 11, at 640–44.  
167 See supra note 91 and accompanying text. Rodriguez also declined to apply strict 
scrutiny based on a fundamental right to education, a right the Court rejected. Rodriguez, 
411 U.S. at 16–29, 35. 
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The contrast with the major gay-rights cases is sharp. Parties or amici in the 
major gay-rights cases pressed for formally heightened scrutiny, but in none did 
the Court take up, let alone clearly resolve, the level of scrutiny issue. Romer and 
Windsor use the language of rational basis but do not employ it in its traditional 
form and never mention the arguments for heightened scrutiny.168 Lawrence could 
have been decided as either an equal-protection or due-process case, and it was 
decided under due process.169 It, too, seemed to use rational basis, though lower 
courts have divided about what level of scrutiny was applied in the case.170 All 
three opinions were written by Justice Kennedy. They have a strong family 
resemblance to one another and are marked by a pronounced doctrinal quirkiness 
that has left a trail of questions. Romer was curiously silent on Bowers, which was 
still good law. Lawrence made no effort to reconcile its version of substantive due 
process with the more restrictive one adopted in Washington v. Glucksberg.171 
Windsor said it was limited to the federal Defense of Marriage Act, even though its 
rationale about the dignity of same-sex couples and the harm to their children of 
denying recognition to their marriages would seem to apply with equal or even 
greater force to state laws barring same-sex marriage. 
The key difference, then, is that the LGBT cases seem to have been decided in 
a post-tiers world, where the nominal application of rational basis is not outcome- 
determinative. By contrast, the poverty cases were decided in a context in which 
the level of scrutiny virtually foretold the outcome. This is somewhat ironic in at 
least one sense. Romer has often been linked to two other decisions famous as 
“rational basis plus” cases. The three are sometimes called the “Moreno-Cleburne-
Romer trilogy.”172 Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, Inc.173 used the rational-
basis standard to strike down a requirement that group homes for people with 
mental retardation secure a special permit.174 Department of Agriculture v. 
Moreno175 is the more relevant one for thinking about poverty. It was a case about 
a federal regulation, and its underlying statute, denying food stamps to households 
of unrelated persons.176 It, too, applied a more muscular rational-basis standard, 
finding the exclusion unrelated to the proffered purpose to avoid fraud in the 
168 See United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2696 (2013); Romer v. Evans, 517 
U.S. 620, 632 (1996). 
169 See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 572–79 (2003). 
170 The disparate rulings are reviewed in WILLIAM B. RUBENSTEIN ET AL., CASES AND 
MATERIALS ON SEXUAL ORIENTATION AND THE LAW 297–315 (5th ed. 2014).  
171 521 U.S. 702, 728 (1997) (holding that the Due Process Clause does not guarantee 
a right to assisted suicide). 
172 See CASS R. SUNSTEIN, ONE CASE AT A TIME: JUDICIAL MINIMALISM ON THE 
SUPREME COURT 146–48 (2001). 
173 473 U.S. 432 (1985). 
174 Id. at 448.  
175 413 U.S. 528 (1973). 
176 Id. at 529. 
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program.177 But the Court also emphasized the “bare congressional desire to harm” 
that was suggested by comments in the legislative history reflecting Congress’s 
desire to deny food stamps to “hippies” and “hippie communes.”178 Because of this 
element, the case has become known more as an equal-protection case about 
lifestyle than poverty. But that was not inevitable. Given that it was decided only a 
few years after Dandridge, and the same year as Rodriguez, Moreno might have 
been the vehicle that led poverty—along with mental disability and sexual 
orientation—to be a context in which some meaningful constitutional protections 
were provided by way of careful analysis of a law using a turbocharged form of 
rational-basis review. This might have included some valuable unpacking of, and 
elaborating on, the meaning of the concept of animus that ran through Moreno, 
Cleburne, and Romer.179 
We have seen, then, how poverty and sexual orientation claims have divergent 
histories with respect to standard of review. There is, however, also an interesting 
point of convergence. Both poverty and sexual orientation pose definitional 
challenges for traditional, class- or classification-based equal protection review.  
The definitional problem associated with poverty is made a centerpiece of the 
Court’s analysis in Rodriguez, which discussed at some length the reasons that the 
Texas funding system did not map cleanly onto individual wealth or even, 
necessarily, the property tax wealth of each district. The Court was unwilling to 
accept various alternative ways to understand how the system disadvantaged 
children in districts with the lowest property wealth and held that the system 
discriminated against “a large, diverse, and amorphous class, unified only by the 
common factor of residence in districts that happen to have less taxable wealth 
than other districts.”180  
The larger issue that hovers over Rodriguez is the daunting question of how to 
define the poor. Because the Court did not see the system as flatly discriminating 
against the poor, it did not have to reach this more difficult definitional question. 
How would the class be defined? By some specified percentage of chosen measure 
of income? If so, what percentage and what measure? By lack of access to certain 
minimum goods? If so, which goods and by what metric of access? By other 
criteria? It is not that there are no definitions, only that there are many plausible 
ones. It is worth noting that the path from Moreno to more nuanced, contextual 
analysis of individual cases could allow judicial review of programs without the 
177 The Court noted in its discussion that the restriction harms “not those persons who 
are ‘likely to abuse the program’ but, rather, only those persons who are so desperately in 
need of aid that they cannot even afford to alter their living arrangements so as to retain 
their eligibility.” Id. at 538. 
178 Id. at 534. 
179 See Cass R. Sunstein, The Supreme Court, 1995 Term—Foreword: Leaving Things 
Undecided, 110 HARV. L. REV. 4, 59–64 (1996) (exploring animus and this trilogy of 
cases). 
180 San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 28–29 (1973). 
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need to answer difficult questions like these. As we have seen, however, that path 
was not pursued either.  
This challenge of judicially identifying a definition of who is poor may shed 
at least some light on an apparent puzzle: Why, even in the twenty-three states that 
have some specific textual language in their constitution about the government’s 
duty or power to provide for basic welfare,181 have most courts done nothing with 
them?182 An equally significant factor is likely political and cultural resistance to a 
tradition of affirmative rights—a resistance shaped by some of the public attitudes 
and perceptions about poverty and welfare discussed earlier.  
Notably, there is also a set of definitional challenges in the context of sexual 
orientation, albeit different ones. Debates about LGBT rights have featured, from 
an early period, a debate about the origins of sexual orientation within individuals. 
This has basically been a question about immutability. Political opponents of 
LGBT rights have argued that sexual identity is a matter of choice and conduct 
(and thus undeserving of legal protection), while many political proponents have 
retorted that sexual identity is given, not chosen, and runs deeper than sexual 
conduct alone (and is thus deserving of protection).183 It is not clear that the origins 
of individual sexual orientation ought to be relevant to the issue of legislative or 
constitutional protection,184 nor is it clear that the categories “nature” and “nurture” 
separate as cleanly as the debate assumes.185 Nevertheless, the immutability 
181 These clauses are sometimes phrased in terms of a duty to care for the poor or 
needy. 
182 William C. Rava, State Constitutional Protections for the Poor, 71 TEMP. L. REV. 
543, 567 (1998) (“[S]tate legislatures [have] wide latitude and almost unfettered discretion 
to define the state constitutionally-mandated terms of state public assistance without 
meaningful judicial review.”).  
183 This debate has, of course, gone beyond political debate. For scholarly accounts, 
see, for example, Kenji Yoshino, The Epistemic Contract of Bisexual Erasure, 52 STAN. L. 
REV. 353, 406–07 (2000) and Janet E. Halley, Sexual Orientation and the Politics of 
Biology: A Critique of the Argument from Immutability, 46 STAN. L. REV. 503, 507–16 
(1994). 
184 See Jane S. Schacter, The Gay Civil Rights Debate in the States: Decoding the 
Discourse of Equivalents, 29 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 283, 309–11 (1994). 
185 The same can be said in the context of poverty. See, e.g., Mario L. Barnes & Erwin 
Chemerinsky, The Disparate Treatment of Race and Class in Constitutional Jurisprudence, 
72 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 109, 122 (2009) (discussing the link between immutability 
and poverty and arguing “the extent of class mobility is far less than is generally 
assumed”); Kaled Sarsour et al., Family Socioeconomic Status and Child Executive 
Functions: The Roles of Language, Home Environment, and Single Parenthood, 17 J. INT’L 
NEUROPSYCHOL. SOC’Y 120, 120–29 (2011) (discussing a study demonstrating that 
socioeconomic inequalities are associated with disparities in child cognitive development 
and executive functions); Margaret A. Sheridan et al., The Impact of Social Disparity on 
Prefrontal Function in Childhood, PLOS ONE, Apr. 2012, at 1–2, available at http://www. 
plosone.org/article/fetchObject.action?uri=info%3Adoi%2F10.1371%2Fjournal.pone.0035 
744&representation=PDF (discussing ways in which neural development in children differs 
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question continues to motivate scientific research of various forms,186 and a 
version of the question has recently arisen in a debate with First Amendment 
implications about banning “conversion therapy” for young people who identify as 
LGBT.187 
There is a separate set of issues relevant to defining the class of LGBT 
persons that focuses not on the origins of sexual attraction in the individual, but on 
the origin of the social categories used to classify people according to their sexual 
object choice. These issues flow from an extensive academic literature on the 
social construction of sexual identity that calls into question categories like 
homosexual, heterosexual, bisexual, and others.188 Much of this literature flows 
from the work of Michel Foucault,189 but lest it seem entirely unconnected to the 
Court, consider Justice Kennedy’s downright Foucauldian reference in Lawrence. 
In the course of carrying out a historical analysis of sodomy regulation for 
purposes of substantive due process review, Kennedy wrote: 
 
The absence of legal prohibitions focusing on homosexual conduct may 
be explained in part by noting that according to some scholars the 
concept of the homosexual as a distinct category of person did not 
emerge until the late 19th century. Thus early American sodomy laws 
were not directed at homosexuals as such but instead sought to prohibit 
nonprocreative sexual activity more generally. This does not suggest 
approval of homosexual conduct. It does tend to show that this particular 
form of conduct was not thought of as a separate category from like 
conduct between heterosexual persons.190 
 
Despite the reference, Kennedy’s constitutional jurisprudence of LGBT rights has 
not resisted the concept of the gay or lesbian person. To the contrary, he has 
argued the centrality of sexual identity to personhood in ways at odds with the 
across social classes and theorizing that the disparity is related to the more sophisticated 
language structures that children in affluent families are more often exposed to and a 
heightened level of stress that children in less affluent classes experience).  
186 See, e.g., JACQUES BALTHAZART, THE BIOLOGY OF HOMOSEXUALITY 12–26 
(2012); J. Michael Bailey, Biological Perspectives on Sexual Orientation, in PSYCHO-
LOGICAL PERSPECTIVES ON LESBIAN, GAY, AND BISEXUAL EXPERIENCES 50 (Linda D. 
Garnets & Douglas C. Kimmel eds., 2d ed. 2003) (outlining the current research on the 
biological and genetic basis of sexual orientation). 
187 CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE §§ 865, 865.1-2 (Supp. II 2014) (codifying Senate Bill 
1172, which banned certain therapies administered by mental health professionals to alter 
sexual orientation); Pickup v. Brown, 728 F.3d 1042, 1048, 1061 (9th Cir. 2013) 
(upholding the law against a First Amendment challenge). 
188 Leading contributions are reviewed in RUBENSTEIN ET AL., supra note 170, at 1–
97. 
189 See generally 1 MICHEL FOUCAULT, THE HISTORY OF SEXUALITY: AN 
INTRODUCTION (Robert Hurley trans., 1990). 
190 Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 568–69 (2003) (citations omitted). 
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category critique.191 By contrast, Justice Scalia has emphasized the distinction 
between status and conduct in his dissents in the area.192 These arguments reveal 
ways in which the basic definition and conceptual place of sexual orientation in an 
equal-protection jurisprudence that was developed largely to address race remain a 
matter of dispute on the Court.  
Some of these definitional problems might be mitigated if the focus were 
shifted from class (the LGBT community, whomever that might describe) to 
classification (individual sexual orientation, defined or described in the way an 
individual chooses). Interestingly, however, the move from focusing on a class 
(poor people as the object of protection) to classification (any lines drawn based on 
income level) might instead aggravate in the context of poverty problems of the 
sort reviewed here. The idea that judges must afford skeptical scrutiny whenever a 
policy uses income as a line would seem to invite Justice Powell’s sort of “whither 
capitalism” response to Rodriguez. It might also produce perverse outcomes if 
conceptually deployed to question programs that may benefit those with lower 




To start where we began, there are many differences that distinguish these two 
movements. The point is decidedly not to flatten these differences or to treat them 
as more alike than they are. Instead, the fact that some broad themes link even 
these disparate cases suggests that there are institutional insights here that can help 
us think critically about the role of courts going forward. Perhaps the clearest 
takeaway is that courts rarely act in a vacuum. They act in the context of other 
actors (other courts, political bodies, public opinion), and their decisions are given 
meaning, in part, by how these other actors, along with social movements, react. 
For this reason, thinking about the role of courts in 2020 means thinking about the 
interacting roles of these other actors, as well.  
  
191 See id. at 575 (“When homosexual conduct is made criminal by the law of the 
State, that declaration in and of itself is an invitation to subject homosexual persons to 
discrimination both in the public and the private spheres. . . . Its continuance as precedent 
demeans the lives of homosexual persons.”).  
192 See id. at 602 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“Today’s opinion . . . eliminate[s] the moral 
opprobrium that has traditionally [been] attached to homosexual conduct.”); Romer v. 
Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 644 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“Coloradans are, as I 
say, entitled to be hostile toward homosexual conduct . . . .”).  
 
                                                     
